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Abstract
This article considers the use of a hybrid instrument to regulate
sheries, comparing this instrument with quantity control and linear
taxation in regards to economic yields and the risk of resource deple-
tion. Hybrid instruments have shown to be central in studies with
static models but have hardly ever been explored in the context of dy-
namic sheries. A numerical example concerned with a single-species
demersal shery where the stock estimate is uncertain indicates that
a combination of price and quantity control in the form of a strictly
convex tax on landings is clearly superior to quantity control. When
cost uncertainty is involved, it can also prove more e¢ cient than the
price instrument.
JEL classication: D82, H21, Q22
Keywords: Fisheries management; Asymmetric information; Uncer-
tainty; Quotas; Taxes; Hybrid instruments; Dynamic optimization
1 Introduction
Due to the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information, the man-
agers of sheries struggle, in practice and theory, with how to secure ef-
ciency. Decisive for the biological and economic outcome is the choice
of control instruments. While direct quantity regulation is most common,
economists often prefer to indirectly control quantities using prices (Jensen,
2008). The issue of comparing linear landing fees with quotas in sheries
management has been addressed in earlier studies (Koenig, 1984a, 1984b;
Anderson, 1986; Androkovich and Stollery ,1991, 1994). Of current interest
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in this debate is a paper by Weitzman (2002) where he proves the superiority
of landing fees over quantity controls when decisions must be made in the
face of inaccurate stock estimates. One of Weitzmans major points is that
greater ecological uncertainty seems to enhance the relative performance of
the price instrument.
This paper adds to Weitzmans (2002) study by also incorporating eco-
nomic uncertainty. When Jensen and Vestergaard (2003) undertook a similar
investigation, they aimed to generalize Weitzmans (1974) propositions about
"Prices vs. Quantities" to dynamic sheries. They found Weitzmans ana-
lytical method to be applicable for schooling sheries where the costs are
additively separable in catches and stock size.1 For demersal instances, how-
ever, where harvesting costs are stock dependent, Jensen and Vestergaard
(2003) found an analytical approach intractable.2 Consequently, when Han-
nesson and Kennedy (2005) investigated this case, they used simulations to
generate results. They showed that either instrument can prove superior over
the other depending on the parameter values of the shery model.
I want to extend the study of how various instruments compare for de-
mersal sheries. Apart from considering price and quantity control, I will
examine a third alternative for the management of dynamic sheries: the
hybrid of these two controls or, more precisely, a strictly convex tax on
landed sh. My emphasis on investigating a hybrid instrument is motivated
by the fact that such regulation tools have shown to be central in studies with
static models (e.g., Roberts and Spence, 1976; Weitzman, 1978; Kaplow and
Shavell, 2002; Pizer, 2002). More importantly, a recent paper by Berglann
(2012) shows that a strictly convex tax on total quantity can be shared among
parties in a way that relieves them from strategic considerations by incor-
porating a share quota parameter in the tax function. In a shery context,
and in the view of the planner, this share quota parameter is interpreted as
the expected number of catches by a vessel divided by the total number of
expected catches in the shing industry. Because the total tax bill for each
1See also Hansens (2008) comments on Jensen and Vestergaards (2003) article.
2McGough et al. (2009) found analytical results for a dynamic stochastic shery in
this case by linearizing the model around the deterministic steady-state. Thus, the model
can not for instance be used to determine corner solutions.
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vessel becomes a strictly decreasing function of the individual share of the
quota, these shares are wanted and tradable. Then, by employing a market
with a xed supply of shares, competitive behavior will ensure an ex post
equilibrium where shers acquire optimal share holdings. For a given tax
function, the distribution of tax payments will therefore be optimal.3
An additional motivating factor for considering hybrid instruments is the
appeal they have in the control of multispecies sheries. Here, exibility
is often demanded because shers targeting certain species frequently face
the dilemma that they have insu¢ cient quotas to cover other jointly caught
species.4 For instance, the "deemed value" system employed by the New
Zealand authorities to manage (multispecies) sheries is a hybrid quota-tax
system that allows each vessel to land catches above its quota for a species if
the owner pays a fee for each unit of catch in excess of his quota holding. For
each species this per-unit charge increases in 20% increments for each 20% by
which a skippers catch exceeds his quota holding (Holland and Herrera, 2006;
Sanchirico et al., 2006; Marchal et al., 2009a, 2009b). Embedding a strictly
convex tax on landings with a quota parameter, as proposed by Berglann
(2012), and doing this for each species constitutes a multispecies shery
control regime that can be viewed as a renement of the "deemed value"
system. By taxing the total quantity of catches landed by a sherman (and
not only catches in excess of his quota holdings), he may nd it protable
to stop shing before his quota is reached for one type of species, while for
another species he may choose to exceed the quota holding. Another sher
may make the decision to stop with a totally di¤erent and opposite nal
catch composition. Thus, with an industry comprising of a large number of
vessels, the aggregate of landings at the end of the year might be closer to
the TAC (or the expected harvest in this tax context) for each species, at
least in comparison to the biased outcome that may occur by employing the
deemed valuemethod.
3The given tax function, however, is second-best because the shery authority has to
ex-ante estimate the best tax function parameters under uncertainty.
4In the long run, dilemmas like these might jeopardize the legitimacy and e¤ectiveness
of a regulatory system as a whole (Spence, 2001). Among other things because of the
economic incentive to discard unintended catches.
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For simplicity, this article employs a single species model and ignores de-
tails about individual vessels by focusing on the expected aggregate catches
of the shing industry. As the vehicle for comparison I use dynamic pro-
gramming to compute the optimal expected present value over an innite
time horizon, for each instrument. Out of concerns for safety (or ecological
resilience), I also investigate each schemes ability to prevent resource extinc-
tion (Roughgarden and Smith, 1996; Sethi et al., 2005; Kramer, 2009). Of
particular interest is a comparison of proportional taxation with the hybrid
scheme proposed here, with the quantity control serving as the benchmark.
The dynamic model is based on the work of Reed (1979).
As in Clark and Kirkwood (1986) andWeitzman (2002), I assume that the
stock size is known only up to probability for the manager when he species
the considered instrument. I also assume that the manager faces economic
uncertainty. Such uncertainty may have several sources, for instance regard-
ing to the price shermen get for landed catches, to the e¢ ciency of various
shing gear and search tools, di¤erences in shermen skills and experience,
and weather and local conditions at sea. To ease computation economic un-
certainty should be limited to comprise of one stochastic variable. For this
purpose I select that variable to be the cost per unit of shing e¤ort.
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 spells out the di-
verse regulation schemes. Section 3 describes the dynamic model and the
information ow, while Section 4 shows how dynamic programming serves to
optimize the instrument parameters. In Section 5, my numerical example is
introduced and results are presented that compare optimal yields under the
various regimes when stock estimates are uncertain and cost uncertainty may
prevail. Also included are results for a deterministic case. Section 6 includes
the investigation of how the instruments fare in terms of the probability of
extinction and Section 7 concludes.
2 Regulatory Instrument Specications
Consider a shing industry comprising a large xed number of identical ves-
sels. These exploit one species. Time is discrete and all parameters and
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variables are non-negative. Total harvest in an arbitrary period is denoted h
and the rst-hand price p for landed sh is constant. Costs per unit harvest
depends on current stock ~x as follows: C (~x) := c=~x where c is a constant
common to all parties. All skippers are prot maximizers with a time per-
spective restricted to the current period. They have all perfect knowledge of
c and current stock size ~x.
Absent regulation and capacity constraints, the shing industry solves
the problem
max
h

ph 
Z x
x h
C (~x) d~x

= max
h

ph  c ln

x
x  h

(1)
where x denotes the stock size in the beginning of the period. The necessary
(and su¢ cient) condition for an interior solution of problem (1) is expressed
by the function HOA (Open Access) dened by
hOA = HOA (x; c) := x  c
p
. (2)
It is well known that outcome (2) might cause overshing, the chief reason
being absence of intertemporal concerns. Suppose some central agent is be-
stowed with the authority to avoid the tragedy of commonsby regulating
the shery. In doing so the agent must cope with blurred information on
the cost parameter c and the stock size x at the beginning of the period. I
consider three control instruments in the hands of the said authority:
 quantity limitation, denoted a Fixed Quota (FQ);
 price control, denoted a Linear Tax (LT);
 strictly convex taxation, denoted an Expected Quota (EQ).
We now dene how shermen comply with these schemes:
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2.1 The Fixed Quota (FQ) Instrument
The regulator species a non-negative total quota q (TAC) for the period.
The shing industry solves the same problem as in the case with no regulation
(1) except that the quantity restriction is binding when q  HOA (x; c). Thus
shermen, regulated by the FQ instrument, select a harvest hFQ equal to
hFQ = HFQ (x; c; q) := max
 
0;min
 
HOA (x; c) ; q

. (3)
2.2 The Linear Tax (LT) Instrument
In this scenario the regulator species a linear tax b on catches in the period.
With reference to (1) the industry, in this case, solve the problem
max
h

(p  b)h  c ln

x
x  h

(4)
subject to the condition 0  h  x. This yields a harvest hLT equal to
hLT = HLT (x; c; b) := max

0;min

x; x  c
p  b

. (5)
2.3 The Expected Quota (EQ) Instrument
A second order approximation of a generic strictly convex tax (without a
lump sum part) levied on the industrys total harvest in the period is given
by
t := h+

2
(h)2 (6)
where   0 and  > 0 are parameters that the regulator can choose for the
period. The problem for the industry is
max
h

ph  t  c ln

x
x  h

(7)
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The necessary (and su¢ cient) condition for an interior solution of (7) is
p     h  c
x  h = 0: (8)
The solution of (8) with respect to h yields two roots. Using the root that
ensures h < x and the condition h  0 yields a harvest hEQ given by
hEQ = HEQ (x; c; ; ) (9)
:= max

0;
1
2

p   + x 
q
(   p+ x)2 + 4c

.
I have now determined how shermen comply under the various regulating
regimes. Let henceforth the integer k refer to time. For the purpose of simple
notation I hereby symbolize control parameter(s) in period k under regime
R 2 fFQ;LT;EQg as
uRk :=
8><>:
qk in case R = FQ
bk in case R = LT
k; k in case R = EQ
:
Correspondingly, the harvest in period k is expressed by hRk = H
R
k
 
xk; c; u
R
k

.
Within each regime the task of the regulator amounts to nd a best valueof
uRk under an innite time horizon perspective. To elaborate on his problem,
I must rst specify the dynamic model and tell how information is updated.
3 The Model and the Information Flow
The information ow, which is illustrated in Figure 1, resembles that assumed
by Weitzman (2002), and Clark and Kirkwood (1986). It comprises in every
period two stages and is described as follows: The exact escapement level
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sk 1 (being the stock remaining at the end of stage k  1 after harvesting) is
common knowledge. From the end of stage k   1 to the beginning of stage
k, breeding takes place. Breeding is accounted for by the discrete resource
model proposed by Reed (1979) given by
xk = zk 1G (sk 1) (10)
where the commonly known average stock-recruitment relationship G () is
multiplied by the random factor zk 1. From (10) stock size xk emerges at
the beginning of stage k. The regulator cannot however, "see" xk since zk 1
has not yet been disclosed for him.
The random variables zk 1 for all k are assumed independent and identi-
cally distributed with probability density function f (zk) = f (z) with mean
z = 1. For the regulator, the cost parameter c is uncertain, but has a known
probability density function  (c) with mean c. Based on such statistical
information for xk and c, the manager must decide a best value of the
parameter(s) uRk of his control instrument R.
Period k k+1k
sk-1
Escapement
commonly
known.
 time
Breeding
zk-1G(sk-1). xk
Realized stochastic
variable zk-1 and
thereby arriving
stock xk observed
only by fishermen.
Manager decides regulatory
parameter(s) ukR in face of
uncertainty about xk and c.
Fishermen choose
harvest hkR under
perfect information.
Breeding
zkG(sk).
takes
place
sk = xk - hkR
xk+1
Figure 1. Informational sequence
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There is an information asymmetry. The shermen are better informed.
They know the realization of zk 1 and thereby the arriving stock xk. Being
aware of costs and of current stock, they respond to the prevailing uRk during
the year by choosing their most economical level of e¤ort and thereby a
ow of catches that at the end yields the prot maximizing harvest hRk =
HRk
 
xk; c; u
R
k

for that year. The escapement becomes
sk = xk   hRk , (11)
which eventually, at the end of the year k, for instance through reports on
catch and e¤ort data, also is revealed for the regulator such that sk becomes
common knowledge. Then next period follows.
4 Optimal Management over Time
Due to the stationarity of the stochastic variables z and c, the dynamic
problem that must be solved by the manager using regime R is the same for
every period k. So without loss of generality, I can in the following consider
the regulators problem at the beginning of period k = 1 when s0 is known.
Stationarity implies that the problem is expressed by the Bellman equation
V R (s0) = max
uR1
E

1
 
x1; c; h
R
1

+ V R
 
x1   hR1
 js0	 (12)
where V R () is the optimal expected present value function,  2 (0; 1) de-
notes the discount factor and harvest is hR1 = H
R
1
 
x1; c; u
R
1

. The function
1 () is the current social economic value of the shery for year 1, given by5
1
 
x1; c; h
R
1

:= phR1   c ln

x1
x1   hR1

. (13)
The expectation operator E fg in this paper stands for the expected value
5This expression is equivalent to shermens prot function under open access (1).
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of whatever is contained within the brackets. In the Bellman equation (12)
the operator pertains to x1 given s0 that has the probability density function
g (x1) :=
1
G (s0)
f

x1
G (s0)

(14)
and to the cost parameter c with probability density function  (c).
As customary the functional equation (12) is solvable through successive
approximations and the result V R () is unique6.
5 Numerical Example
In my numerical example sh commands price p = 1, and the discount factor
 = 0:9. The stock-recruitment model that Clark and Kirkwood (1986) used
in their numerical example is given by (1  exp ( 2s)). Since extinction
probabilities are of great interest and concern (see next section), I want to
extend that example to include the possibility of resource collapse. Hence, I
specify the model as
G (s) = (1  exp ( 2s)) (1  exp ( 10s)) . (15)
The deterministic model thus has a stable natural equilibrium at x = 0:796,
but also an unstable equilibrium point at x = 0:0776.7 Thus, the population
is doomed to extinction if the stock ever falls below the critical depensation
level given by the unstable equilibrium point.
The stochastic variables z and c are both assumed lognormally distrib-
uted. While the probability density distribution f (z) has standard deviation
z = 0:4, and as already stated, a mean z = 1, the corresponding parameters
for the c distribution  (c) are c = 0:1 and c = 0:1, respectively. The follow-
ing diagrams are parametric plots with s0 as the varying parameter. They
6For s0 high enough is 1
 
x1; c; h
R
1

concave. Under these circumstances the solution
is unique (Weitzman, 2002).
7These natural equilibrium points are determined by setting x = s (i.e. no harvesting),
and the equation becomes x = G (x).
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use expected recruitment E fx1g as the abscissa function, given by
E fx1g = E fx1j s0g = E fz0G (s0)g = zG (s0) = G (s0) . (16)
Figures 2, 3 and 5 displays solutions of the functional equation (12) given
in last section. The legends of these gures (and the gures that follow as
well) indicate to which system the various curves belong, ranked after the
ordinate value at the end of the abscissa axis. Figure 2 shows the optimal
expected present value function V R (s0) of the shery for all systems R and
under the statistical parameter values I have picked out. Known costs for the
EQ and LT system, stands for that costs are given by its mean value c. The
deterministic system is equivalent to an FQ system where the value of z0 is
known and given by its mean value z = 1. The according optimal policies
appear in Figure 3. These policies are displayed in the form of targets for the
optimal expected escapement levels denoted E

sR1 js0
	
for regime R and
calculated by
E

sR1 js0
	
= E

max
 
0; x1  HR1
 
x1; c; u
R
1 (s0)
 js0	 (17)
where uR1 (s0) is the obtained optimal argument functions that are depicted
in Figure 5 and dened as
uR1 (s0) :=
8><>:
q1 (s0) in case R = FQ
b1 (s0) in case R = LT
1 (s0) ; 

1 (s0) in case R = EQ
.
In addition, Table 1 and 2 list the optimal expected present value V R
 
E

sR1
	
and the expected recruitment level G
 
E

sR1
	
at the stationary optimal ex-
pected escapement level (dened implicitly asE

sR1
	
:= E

sR1
E sR1 		)
for all of my choices.
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Figure 2. Expected value vs expected recruitment.
Table 1: Expected present value at the stationary expected escapement level, V R
 
E

sR1
	
.
Deter- FQ FQ LT / EQ LT EQ
ministic c=0. c=0.1 c=0. c=0.1 c=0.1
1.096 0.7197 0.7438 1.105 0.9051 0.9430
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Figure 3. Expected escapement vs expected recruitment.
Table 2: Expected recruitment at the stationary expected escapement level,G
 
E

sR1
	
.
Deter- FQ FQ LT / EQ LT EQ
ministic c=0. c=0.1 c=0. c=0.1 c=0.1
0.5273 0.5719 0.5668 0.5186 0.5620 0.5533
Notice in Figure 3 how the constant escapement policy emerges for the
deterministic case. No harvest takes place when x1 (= E fx1g) is lower than
a specic value; when x1 (= E fx1g) is above this point, optimality dictates
that all stock in excess of the specied escapement level should be harvested.
For the two FQ cases (with uncertain x1; with and without cost uncer-
tainty), the optimal escapement diagrammed in Figure 3 are non-constant
feedback solutions, which yields quota settings q1 = q1 (s0) (Figure 5) depen-
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dent on the result of stock surveys. Not shown in any of these gures is that
these quota settings are slightly higher than the harvest being expected by
the manager, a gap that increases with the value of E fx1g and becomes more
dominant in the cost uncertainty case. The gap is caused by that the quota
q1 will not always be binding because the open access solution in some cases
can take over as the catch boundary. This limitation is favorable because it
happens in instances when the stock happens to be low and can then save the
stock from extinction. A high cost by itself means a low value of the shery.
Even though, under cost uncertainty is a cost level above mean costs c more
honored because the mentioned harvest limitation is more likely to be active
than if costs are correspondingly below c. As seen in Figure 3 and Table 1,
this asymmetry in cost appreciation (from the managers side) is the reason
why the FQ case with cost uncertainty has a higher expected present value
than in the known cost case.
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Figure 4. Expected escapement vs expected recruitment. Close-up of Figure 3.
In Figure 4, a close-up of Figure 3, we see better the result remarked
by Clark and Kirkwood (1986): the FQ (known costs) optimal policy is not
uniformly cautious. The threshold for E fx1g, when the FQ curve leaves the
line where the optimal harvest is zero, is lower with stock uncertainty than
with exact knowledge. Clark and Kirkwood found this e¤ect to increase with
the stock uncertainty level. The reason is that the optimal harvest, on the
boundary when the threshold is exceeded, will be low. The harvest is then
safe in the sense that the e¤ect on the value due to the danger of extinction is
minimal. Since stock uncertainty means the possibility of the stock becoming
larger than the optimal deterministic threshold, it is optimal with a lower
threshold level than that found in the deterministic case. My result indicates
that adding cost uncertainty has the same inuence on the threshold level as
increased stock uncertainty.
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With linear landing fees and known costs, the similar threshold for when
harvesting should be allowed is, as we see in Figure 3 and 4, very low. The
low threshold is caused by the possibility to instill the price in such a manner
that it will block harvesting when the stock happens to be slightly lower than
the favored value. Then, as I demonstrate in the next section, harvesting can
take place with a risk of resource collapse that approximates the chance at no
harvest. With these features it is di¢ cult to perform better. Not surprisingly,
I therefore nd EQ regulation to approximate LT control in this known costs
case: 1  b1 and 1  0 for all s0.
Figure 5. Optimal instrument parameter values vs expected recruitment.
Another observation is in Figure 5: the optimal landing fee is indepen-
dent of E fx1g8. Weitzman (2002) nds an analytical expression for such a
8For E fx1g below the treshold level is zero harvest the optimal policy. This closed
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constant landing tax by assuming that the regulator knows recruitment x1.
He can assume common information of x1 because he predicts ahead that
the tax is equal for all x1 (= E fx1g) and then regulator does not need any
stock size estimate. I, however, must neglect that approach to make the out-
come comparable to my other cases where the optimal tax might depend on
E fx1g. Then I nd (numerically) that the tax should be higher than in the
Weitzman case and furthermore, a higher expected present value.
The e¤ect that only knowing x1 up to probabilitymakes the shery
more valuable is peculiar but comparable to what I found above for the FQ
system where cost uncertainty made the shery more prized. The explanation
is asymmetry in the appreciation of the uncertainty; the chance of a high
stock level is weighted more than the loss of value, due to the corresponding
chance of a lower stock level. As we see in Figure 2 for high values of E fx1g
and in Table 1, the uncertain costs case considered here even dominates the
deterministic instance.
While it is the other way round for the FQ regime the entrance of cost
uncertainty when regulating with the LT and EQ systems decreases the ex-
pected present value of the shery. As we see in gure 5, for the LT system,
the optimal b1 control is no longer constant with respect to s0. It decreases
with expected recruitment and it is higher (which reects a more cautious
policy) than its known costs counterpart. Furthermore, contrary to FQ
regulation, the threshold for when the shery should open increases with the
cost uncertainty level.
For the EQ instrument under cost uncertainty, the extra degree of freedom
of having one more parameter to adjust to reach an optimum is now put to
use. Figure 5 shows clearly at which E fx1g-value an initially closed shery
should be opened up. A shery in a closed state (which can be achieved by
many 1; 1 combinations) is indicated here by that the 1-value has jumped
out of the diagram to a very high (or innite) value while the 1 parameter
value is arbitrary. We see in Figure 4 that the E fx1g threshold value falls
together with the threshold for the LT regime with identical cost uncertainty.
Returning to Figure 5 we observe, for the shery in the open state, that the
state of the shery is achieved with any tax choice equal to or above the constant value.
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1 parameter decreases with expected recruitment while the 1- parameter
rst increase, and then reach a maximum level before it decreases again. A
main nding is that the EQ system is superior to the LT system. This is for
instance reected in Figure 2 and by that the stationary expected present
value (in Table 1) is higher for the EQ system. Both the LT and EQ regimes,
however, signicantly outperform the FQ system.
So far I have compared the systems in the context of the optimal expected
present value. Some of these optimal policies can be very risky with respect
to keeping the sh stock alive. As Clark and Kirkwood (1986) say about
their own ndings for the FQ system: The counterintuitive nature of these
results may in part be a consequence of our assumption of risk neutrality,
or more precisely, of the assumption that there is no intrinsic preservation
valueassociated with the resource stock.
Such a preservation valuewould have been given a higher weight in
above calculations if the discount factor had been assumed to be closer to
one. My investigation focus on how instruments fare in terms of extinction
probabilities.
6 The Probability for Extinction
The resource model (15) allows for the possibility of critical depensation.
More precisely, if the next period stock x2 falls below the unstable equilib-
rium point, the population will eventually die out. Let  (x2) denote the
probability density function for x2 after harvesting. Then the probability for
extinction for each initial escapement level s0, is calculated as the cumulative
distribution function 	 (x2) for the stock to be below x2:
Pr (x2  x2) = 	 (x2) := 1 
Z 1
x2
 (x2) dx2 (18)
where x2 = 0:0776 is the unstable equilibrium point of the model.
The probability distribution function for x2 when c is xed, is written as
20
 (x2 jc) =
Z 1
0
 (x2 jx1; c) g (x1) dx1 (19)
where g (x1) is the probability density function for x1 for a given s0, as dened
in (14) and
 (x2 jx1; c) := dz1 (x1; x2; c)
dx2
f (z1 (x1; x2; c)) (20)
is the probability distribution for x2 for given values of x1 and c. The function
f () is the probability distribution for z and the function z1 (x1; x2; c) is given
by
z1 (x1; x2; c) =
x2
G (x1  HR1 (x1; c; uR))
(21)
whereHR1
 
x1; c; u
R is the harvest under regulation systemR 2 fFQ;LT;EQg.
The wanted probability distribution function for x2 when allowing the cost
parameter c to be uncertain is now determined by
 (x2) =
Z 1
0
 (x2 jc)  (c) dc (22)
where  (c) is the probability density function for c.
21
Figure 6. Probability for extinction after optimal harvesting for each system, respectively.
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Figure 7. Probability for extinction after optimal harvesting for each system, respectively.
Figures 6 and 7 show the probability of extinction on a logarithmic scale
as a function of expected recruitment E fx1g when respective optimal policies
are employed. Comparison between the two upper curves in Figure 6 reveals
that the higher expected present value I found in last section for the shery
due to cost uncertainty in the FQ case presents itself at the expense of an
increased extinction probability.
As mentioned can the LT (and the approximately equivalent EQ) regime
with known costs be very e¤ectively instilled. Optimal parameter settings
will block the harvest if the stock size is slightly below the optimal level,
and as we see in the lower part in Figure 6 the result is an extinction risk
Pr (x2  x2) that is only meagerly higher than the risk associated with no
harvesting at all. The distinctness is only recognizable in the gure for high
values of E fx1g. Still in Figure 6, we see that the FQ system expose the
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sh stock for a signicantly higher extinction risk even though the harvest
outcome of its optimal policy is considerably lower.
Figure 8. Probability for extinction after optimal harvesting for FQ with z=0.4
Regarding fair comparison between the various systems: A ceteris paribus
condition for a comparison would emerge when the expected harvest out-
comes are equal. For the EQ regime there will in this case be many combina-
tions of its two parameters that yield the same expected harvest. So for this
system I determine which combination of 1 and 1 that for a given expected
harvest gives the minimum extinction probability. Today, regulation in sh-
eries is largely implemented by the FQ system. Then the intrinsic value of an
eventual diminished extinction probability is a direct measure of the Pareto
improvement (free lunch) when changing to an LT or an EQ regime.
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Figure 8 shows curves for the systems under cost uncertainty when the
expected harvest in all instances is the optimal harvest for the FQ system
when z = 0:4. The curve for this case is displayed in all the gures 6, 7 and 8.
First, (in Figure 8) pay attention to the LT and EQ curves labeled z = 0:4:
The EQ regime gives the lowest extinction probability. Its superiority over
the FQ system increases with E fx1g and the extinction probability is about
60% less for the highest abscissa values. Also the LT system is inferior to
the EQ regime. For a small range of middle values of E fx1g the extinction
probability for the LT regime is even higher than for the FQ system.
Now let us turn to all curves in Figure 8 labeled z = 0:5. We know
from Weitzman (2002) (although he did not include cost uncertainty) that
the advantage of price compared to quantity control may increase along with
ecological uncertainty. Thus, with cost uncertainty held xed, and with
a higher stock uncertainty, the LT regime should perform better; at least
compared to the FQ system. We see, as predicted by Weitzman, that the
performance of the LT system is now markedly better than that of the FQ
regime. The increased extinction probability associated with the increased
stock uncertainty is minimal for the LT regime (on the logarithmic scale),
and while the EQ system still dominates, its comparable advantage over LT
regulation is much less.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper compares various tools for managing sheries using a numerical
example. The two most important factors in the example are: (a) unit har-
vesting costs depend on sh abundance (as is typical in a demersal shery),
and (b) instrument parameters are assigned a "best value" based on statis-
tical knowledge. I assume that the sh stock survey has a 40% standard
deviation from its mean, and that uncertainty regarding shermens costs on
unit shing e¤ort has a 100% standard deviation from its mean.
I consider three instruments: quantity control (FQ), linear taxes (LT),
and expected quotas (EQ). The name of the latter instrument denotes the
amount of catches expected by the planner when shers are levied a strictly
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convex tax on catches. The most commonly used tool is quantity con-
trol. Chu (2009) estimated that several hundred stocks in eighteen countries
around the world are regulated through the individual transferable quota
(ITQ) regime, in which shares of TAC are e¢ ciently distributed among sh-
ermen by trades in a competitive share market. The purpose of privatizing
the right to catch a xed quota (FQ) is that the incentive to race for sh
for strategic reasons may vanish. A linear landing tax (LT) is an alternative
proposed by Weitzman (2002), among others. In a general discrete model
where the sh stock is a function of the last period escapement, Weitzman
shows that such a control is unambiguously superior to quotas under pure
ecological uncertainty.
The alternative manager instrument (EQ) presented in this paper is based
on levying shermen a strictly convex tax on landing. The results in my
example show that the EQ system signicantly Pareto dominates the practice
of quota regulation. This domination is expressed both in terms of a higher
optimal expected present value for the shery and, under circumstances of an
equivalent expected harvest outcome, in terms of a smaller stock extinction
probability. When cost uncertainty is present, strictly convex taxation also
dominates the linear landing fee approach, but, as conjectured by Weitzman
(2002), to a lesser extent when ecological variance increases.
As Berglann (2012) shows, the scheme may be as potentially easy to im-
plement as an individual transferable quota (ITQ) regime. The individual
quota in the ITQ regime will then correspond to an individual transferable
expected quota (ITEQ) in the hybrid regime. The exibility of that lat-
ter quota notion might, as mentioned in the introduction, be particularly
valuable in managing a multispecies shery. Total (expected) quotas, each
indirectly specied by tax parameters, could be set for each regulated species.
The tax amount saved by landing less than the quota for one species will be
used to cover the extra tax amount levied for exceeding the expected quota
of another species.
Vessel owners in an ITQ managed shery that already possess quotas or
are accustomed to getting them for free will of course oppose the transition to
a regime where they suddenly are levied an extra tax. However, as Berglann
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(2012) also demonstrates, the proposed system can easily be adjusted to re-
distribute the tax gained by the government by giving the individual skipper
a rebate that ensures that his tax expenses is nullied if he happens reach
the expected quantity exactly. In this way the transition from ITQ based
management to the proposed scheme might be smoothly carried out.
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